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A Study of Automatically Renewable Long-Term Contracts Across Jurisdictions 
 
Abstract 
This article deconstructs mobile phone contracts as an example of long-term contractual 
relations in four jurisdictions to reveal that there are three elements which define consumer 
protection. The elements are contract duration, renewal of the agreement, and unilateral 
modification. Each of these factors are regulated differently in each of the jurisdictions, but, 
assessed collectively, similar levels of consumer protection are found. The authors show that 
the reason for the different weighting is determined by regulation (subject-specific or 
general), external factors, such as technological development, geography or business 
considerations, and by wider cultural considerations. The comparison of these features across 
the jurisdictions shows that, ultimately, regulatory intervention plays little role in contract 
design, unless an overwhelming policy goal is pursued, which means that, in most cases, 
regulators would be advised to avoid or reduce regulation of mobile phone and other long- 
term contracts.  
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Introduction 
The evolution of technology and corresponding changes in consumer behaviour (Bar-Gill and 
Stone 2012, p. 430) have led to mobile phones becoming a necessary and indeed central part 
of modern private and business life. Despite their ubiquity, mobile phone contracts have 
attracted relatively little scholarly attention; exceptions are Bar-Gill and Stone (2012) and 
Bar-Gill (2012, ch 4, p. 185). They provide a useful case study of the legal regulation of long-
term contracts more generally. While business models and economic structures move away 
from one-off transactions to long term relations, as expressed in the advent of the so-called 
sharing  economy or ‘subscription economy’ (McKinsey 2018), a heavily regulated type of 
contract, such as those for mobile phones, will serve as a model for insights that apply 
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equally to other types of long-term contractual relationships. This is even more poignant as 
many of the sharing and subscription business models are driven by mobile telephony. 
This article will focus on the three features that characterise mobile phone, and other long-
term, contracts the most: the duration of the contract, ie the initial commitment period, the 
ability to automatically renew the contract at the end of the initial term, and the possibility of 
unilateral modification of the contract by the service provider. It will do so by comparing the 
solutions applied in four jurisdictions – Germany, the UK, the US, and Canada1 – which 
provide examples of different approaches to the regulation of mobile phone contracts and 
illustrate differing attitudes to long-term contracts.2 However, it will not attempt to provide 
an analysis of every aspect of the customer-provider relationship in long term contracts, and 
will not address questions of wider contract and consumer law, such as remedies for breach 
and contracting mechanisms more generally. 
It will be argued that the features which are the focus of analysis are characteristic for mobile 
phone, and other long -term contracts which indicate whether a system of law favours 
consumer or business interests. It will be shown that the balance struck between these three 
features depends on the wider policies pursued by the legislator. A policy that forms part of 
the legislators’ concerns across all jurisdictions is the competitiveness of markets as a way to 
protecting consumers’ interests. It will be shown that regulating the contractual framework of 
mobile phone and other long term contracts does not have the effect of creating a competitive 
market. Regulation of the crucial aspects – initial term, renewal and unilateral modification – 
can discourage competitors from entering the market since it is less attractive to join a 
heavily regulated market than a less regulated market. The effects of such regulation are 
therefore likely to lead to either price increases or reduced competition, unless they are 
compensated internally by relaxing regulation of another key factor.  
 
I. General characteristics of long term mobile phone contracts 
                                                     
1 The jurisdictions were chosen as representatives of the varying approaches to long term contracts which outlined 
in another study, see Dodsworth et al. 2014. 
2 This comparison will be methodologically based on functional equivalents (Zweigert and Kötz 1988), which 
means that although this paper will outline the approach taken by courts of the varying jurisdictions, relying on 
structural (functional) comparison (Weir 1992, p. 1616), the focus will be on the conclusion arrived at (Samuel 
2014, p. 17-8) and therefore, no suggestions will be made about which system may offer the ‘better’ solution 
(see on the topic of legal transplants, Legrand 1997). 
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Mobile phone penetration is at or above 100% in many Western countries, with around 70% 
of consumers having access to a smartphone. In those countries mobile phone use is mainly 
facilitated by post-paid contracts between users and providers, which are subject to varying 
levels of regulation in different jurisdictions despite some having a common framework (in 
the EU Council Directive 2018/1972/EU establishing the European Electronic 
Communications Code; in Canada Telecom Regulatory Policy 2013/271/CA). In developing 
countries, the market looks often rather different and most consumers use mobile phones on a 
Pay as You Go-basis; in some parts of Africa, for example, mobile phone serve the additional 
function of providing financial services to the “unbanked and under-banked” local population 
(Malala 2018, p. 363). This article will focus on the first situation, long term post-paid 
agreements; as to the alternative situation see the papers in the JCP Special Issue on 
Consumer Law in Africa (2018, issue 4). 
Long term contracts are primarily identified and characterised by the obligations the parties 
assume, and are entitled to expect, under them. For mobile phone contracts, these are the 
price and the basket of goods and services provided in exchange. Typically, a mobile phone 
contract will include a number of telephony minutes, text messages, and a volume of data as 
part of the monthly subscription price; additional usage is to be paid for on a use basis. Often, 
the package included the provision of a handset. This bargain that the parties have struck is 
beyond the analysis of this article. It is often beyond the reach of the law in any case as the 
adequacy of the bargain is typically not subject to legal control; such core terms are, eg, 
exempt from the assessment for fairness under the European Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
(Dir 93/13/EEC art. 4(2)). This article will analyse instead those features that are most likely 
to have the greatest influence on the commercial bargain: the initial commitment period, the 
mechanism of renewal on expiry of the initial term, and the possibility to unilaterally alter the 
term. 
At the same time, pricing is one of the most important aspect in consumer’s decision making 
when choosing mobile-phone contracts. Existing research has focussed on the complexity of 
pricing structures which are likely to confuse customers (for more information on behavioural 
economics in relation to consumers see Lunn (2013), Bar-Gil (2012). One innovative pricing 
technique, found in some countries, is the partial unbundling of telephony services from the 
sale of handsets in order to avoid cumbersome aspects of regulation. Handsets are sold on 36-
months credit agreements that are coupled to a 24-months mobile telephony contract. This 
set-up allows providers to overcome the maximum contract length of 24-months that exists in 
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some countries. This set up, on the other hand, addresses a concern in the more traditional 
bundled version of contracting where some consumers continue to pay for a subsidised 
handset after the expiry of the initial commitment period, despite the cost of the handset 
being fully amortised (Ofcom 2018). As these aspects do not concern the long term contract 
as such, they are beyond the scope of this article. 
 
The identification of these three aspects somewhat resembles the division in duration, 
economy and terms suggested by Bell (1989) as key concerns in long term contracts. Each of 
these features will be examined in turn, with particular attention paid to the way in which the 
degree and nature of regulation is influenced by policy considerations as expressed in 
industry-specific regulation and the general law, as well as by external factors, such as 
technological developments, geography and business influences. Other factors that might 
have an impact on long term mobile phone contracts, such as broader cultural preferences, 
will not be discussed here. An example of such factors is the openness of the market for 
foreign service providers (Standing Committee on Industry Science and Technology 2010). 
In this sense, culture refers to certain long-held and deeply ingrained preferences shared 
within a legal system. Some of those phenomena will be encountered later, such as the 
attitude of German law that parties to a long-term contract must strictly comply with notice 
periods, without a reminder to that effect, or the emphasis placed on one-off transactions 
which has led to a level of hostility to long-term commitments. The reasons for those 
preferences and a more thorough analysis of them is outside the scope of this paper.  
That is not to say that initial duration, renewal and unilateral modification are the only 
features of contract law that determine the level of consumer protection. Other aspects of 
contract law, such as inter alia the availability of, and pre-requisites for the exercise of, 
remedies, or withdrawal rights during a cooling-off period, and other branches of law, in 
particular trading standards and access to dispute resolution mechanisms, are equally 
important for the level of consumer protection found within a system. These areas are not 
specific to long term contracts, as exemplified by mobile phone contracts, though and will 
therefore not be further discussed. It will be noted though, that some systems under 
discussion heavily rely on general contract law, whereas others provide sector specific 
regulation. The internal positioning of the rules is of no significance for the determination of 
the overall level of consumer protection. 
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II. Initial Commitment Period 
There are two prototypes of mobile phone contracts. First, the prepaid or monthly rolling 
contracts, where the customer either pre-pays or post-pays for a service on a monthly basis 
without commitment beyond one month. Second, contracts with a pre-determined initial 
commitment period of over one month, where the customer will pay a set fee for at least the 
number of months set out in the contract term. This article will focus solely on the second 
type as a long-term commitment. Contracts of that type in turn can include the provision of a 
handset, or they can be SIM-only, ie limited to the provision of telephony services without 
the necessary hardware. The following analysis is based on the assumption that the majority 
of mobile phone contracts include the provision of handsets and are designed to attract 
customers by makings the expensive handset more affordable. Most of the findings apply 
equally to SIM-only contracts though. 
The mobile phone user, when entering into the agreement, will consider the length of time 
that they will be bound by the contract, not only in order to compare market rates but also to 
make the (usually costly) handset affordable by being able to pay for it in instalments (Bar-
Gill and Stone 2012). Mobile phone providers have a substantial interest in binding 
customers for a certain length of time to amortise the cost of the handset (Bar-Gill 2012, p. 
207). They can also attract new business by allowing the customer to spread the cost of the 
handset over a period of time, making the contract seem more affordable (Bar-Gill 2012, pp. 
223-231). We will see later, though, that there are disadvantages for service providers when 
the provision of the services becomes costlier, which is why they may want to modify the 
price, either during the initial commitment period or upon renewal. 
The options for initial commitment periods for mobile phone contracts have changed over 
time (Dodsworth et al. 2014). In the past, mobile phone providers offered a whole range of 
options, from one-month rolling contracts to contracts for 12, 18, 24 and even 36-months. 
Today, however, 24 months contracts dominate the market in all the jurisdictions under 
consideration (Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar 2013). To the extent that this represents a change in 
practice, it has come about through a combination of regulatory intervention, business 
influences, technology and culture. In order to establish the regulatory context within which 
this article will consider these influences, it is necessary to consider the national rules of each 
jurisdiction.  
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1. The Law  
In Europe, the length of mobile phone contracts is determined not only by national laws but 
also by the regulatory framework laid down by the European Union. The EU has recognised 
the importance of the telecommunications sector as an essential element in furthering the 
internal market. In 2002, it established the Telecommunications Framework Directive, which 
was then followed by the ‘EU Telecoms Package’ in 2009 (Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009; 
Council Directive 2009/136/EC; Council Directive 2009/140/EC; Telecom Regulatory Policy 
2013). with the aim of harmonising the market on telecommunication services. The legal 
basis for the package is the achievement of the internal market according to Articles 26 and 
114 TFEU; the first EU measure in this sector (Council Directive (EC) 1988/301 on 
Competition in the Markets in Telecommunications Terminal Equipment) was enacted to 
increase competition in the then predominantly landline telecoms market. As with the later 
measures, the tool of competition is used to support the aim of creating the internal market 
(Dir 1988/301/EEC rec. 3). The 2009 EU Telecoms Package introduced a maximum initial 
commitment period of 24 months and the obligation to offer a 12 months tariff (Council 
Directive 2009/136/EC, art 30(5)). The maximum length of 24 months is now enshrined in 
the European Electronic Communications Code (Council Directive 2018/1972/EU art. 105), 
which has given up the requirement for a 12 months variant. In the UK, the maximum length 
for mobile phone contracts had not previously been regulated by specific legislation and the 
national regulator – OFCOM – had not taken any action to reduce the initial commitment 
period. Ofcom had taken steps to restrict the automatic renewal of contracts though (Ofcom 
2013). It was therefore common to find 36-month contracts, although these only ever 
accounted for a minority of the market. The majority (80 %) of UK mobile phone contracts 
prior to the 2009 Directive, in fact, had a length of 18 months. This has now changed 
dramatically. 24-month contracts now account for two-thirds of the UK market, and the last 
third is split more or less equally between one-month rolling contracts and 12-month 
contracts (Ofcom 2013a). The previously popular 18-month contracts have now almost 
entirely disappeared, accounting for only 2 % of the market. While it should be 
acknowledged that technological developments have contributed to this development, 
regulatory intervention has had a clear economic impact, with the majority of contracts 
shifting towards the upper permissible limit. The shift will be examined below but suffice it 
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to say at this stage that the number of 18-month contracts dropped by half within 6 months of 
a change in legislation. 
A different shift can be observed in Canada where the desire was, rather than harmonisation, 
to make the market more competitive. In 2012, the Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) began a public consultation to establish a 
mandatory code for cellular wireless services (Telecom Regulatory Policy 2013), which 
resulted in the CRTC Wireless Code. The consultation was sparked after a parliamentary 
committee had concluded that the progress of broadband penetration in Canada was 
‘disappointing’ (Middleton 2011, p. 69.5). Overall, it was therefore accepted that the 
telecommunications sector should be reviewed, coupled with a particular recommendation 
that steps should be taken to introduce more competition in the market (Middleton 2011, p. 
69.9). As a measure to improve competitiveness, the CRTC Wireless Code introduced a 
maximum initial commitment period of 24 months (Telecom Regulatory Policy 2013, para. 
220). Before the introduction of the Wireless Code, mobile phone contracts in Canada 
typically had an initial commitment period of 36 months (CBC News 2012), which was 
considered to be contrary to consumers’ interests, due to the fact that handsets were often out-
of-date before the initial commitment period had ended. However, an effect of the 
introduction of the Wireless Code and the shortening of contracts to 24 months has been a 
stagnation of the contract price; this is in contrast to most other countries where typical 
contract prices have continuously fallen (NGL Nordicity Group Ltd. 2017, p. 29, fig. 3; 
OECD 2011).  
In contrast to the Canadian and English approaches, mobile phone contracts in Germany are 
primarily regulated by general contract law rather than by industry-specific regulations. The 
industry regulator, the federal network agency (Bundesnetzagentur) lays down rules on 
contracting to a very limited extent only in the Transparenz Verordnung 2016 §5, and 
predominantly deals with technical aspects of the telecommunications services. The 
regulation of the initial commitment period is mostly determined by the general provisions on 
unfair contract terms in consumer contracts. §309 No 9 (a) BGB limits the initial 
commitment period of any long-term consumer contract entered into based on the trader’s 
standard terms of contracting to 24 months. A term providing for a duration of more than 24 
months in any such consumer contract would be considered unfair and thus void. The EU 
Telecoms Package that affected the English maximum initial commitment period had little 
influence on the German approach, because the initial commitment period for most contracts 
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was already limited to 24 months under general contract law (BGB §309(9)(a)). In the sector-
specific legislation, § 43b TKG reiterates the maximum of 24 months and extends it further to 
individually negotiated contracts and to contracts entered into by small traders, who would 
not be regarded as consumers as they are not dealing for private consumptive purposes. These 
extensions highlight the very limited scope of application of § 43b as it is unlikely that 
mobile phone contracts are based on anything other than the provider’s standard terms of 
contracting; the provision in the explanatory notes on the bill is therefore referred to solely as 
“avoiding deficient implementation” (Bundesregierung 2011, p. 65). § 43b TKG further 
provides that providers must offer a 12 months tariff as it serves to implement Council 
Directive 2009/136/EC, art. 30(5), which is described as a measure to further improve 
competition, (Bundesregierung 2011, p. 65).  
In the US, the Federal Communications Commission deals with, inter alia, mobile phones, 
but does not extend its activities to the contractual arrangements between consumers and the 
provider. The regulation of the terms and conditions of mobile phone contracts therefore falls 
to the individual states. There is a federal prohibition on the regulation of rates but an express 
authorisation to make provisions for the regulation of ‘other terms and conditions.’ (47 US 
Code 2012, § 332(c) (3) (A)). Despite several attempts at both state (Public Utilities 
Commission of the State of California 2006; MA S1617, 2013; Minnesota Statutes 2004 
§325F.695; for New York see Chang 2012; some form of mobile phone consumer protection 
has been discussed by the legislators of 22 states (Ante 2008)) and federal (Cell Phone User 
Bill of Rights, S. 1216, 108th Cong 2003) levels, no ‘mobile phone users bill of rights’ has so 
far been successfully established. There is no nationwide data available as to the initial 
commitment period of mobile phone contracts; in practice, by far the most common are 24-
month contracts (O’Grady 2008; a legislative overview is given by Bar-Gill (2012, pp. 239-
240)). 
This overview suggests that legislative regulation can affect the initial commitment period in 
two ways. The most obvious effect is when it limits the length of the contract, where 
previously most contracts were longer than the new imposed maximum length. In those 
cases, the providers will (necessarily) shorten the length of the initial commitment period 
with the consequence of a rise in the monthly subscription cost, as has occurred in Canada.  
However, the second scenario relates to cases where a maximum initial commitment period is 
imposed where previously the market was relatively diverse, as in the case of the UK. It 
would appear that where the regulator imposes a maximum limit on the initial commitment 
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period, the market moves towards the new maximum (permissible) limit (Cooter and Ulen 
2012, pp. 32-33). Atamer (2017, p. 641) points to the move towards the maximum 
permissible in case of the levy of £12 default fees for credit cards after the UK Office of Fair 
Trading set this as the threshold to unfairness. For mobile phone contracts, this has the effect 
of severely diminishing the mid-range market (ie 12- and 18-month contracts). The claim that 
limiting the contract term to 24 months can ‘balance the interests of both parties’ (Atamer 
2017, p. 648) seems therefore not always correct. It is not suggested here that legislative 
intervention is the only explanation for the change in the market, but it is argued that it is a 
significant factor, as the three examples of Germany, the UK and Canada have shown that in 
systems that prescribe a maximum contract length, the market tends to move towards making 
use of the maximum, at the expense of other options. Only in the US was a de facto 2-year 
limitation settled on without regulatory intervention. Under some of the proposed mobile phone 
users bills of rights the contract duration would have been regulated (see, e.g., MA S1617 2013-2014, 
S 120A.  
 
2. Business Influences  
Alongside the initial commitment period, the other key consideration for mobile phone users 
is the monthly cost of the contract. A lower monthly cost may incentivise consumers to enter 
into longer-term contracts. Similarly, if more customers enter into longer contracts (for 
example where the market changed, as in the UK) then this might in turn reduce the monthly 
cost of the contract, since service providers would have more certainty as to their income 
over a longer period. 
The term “business influences” in this section refers to the influence of a change in the 
maximum initial commitment period on the cost of the overall contract, taking into account 
the overall fall in contract prices for the same time period in countries which introduced no 
change in the initial commitment period. As shown above, the 2009 EU Telecoms Package, 
which introduced a maximum term of 24 months (now Council Directive 2018/1972/EU art. 
105(1)), had an effect on UK consumers, as most mobile phone contracts used to be for a 
maximum period of 12 or 18 months (Ofcom 2013a). The Directive seems to have almost 
eradicated 18-month contracts (a fall from 63 % in the last quarter of 2008 to 24 % by the 
first quarter of 2010 and only 3 % by the first quarter of 2011) in favour of 24-month 
contracts (a rise from 7 % in the last quarter of 2008, to 50 % by the first quarter of 2010 and 
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68 % in the first quarter of 2011) (Ofcom 2013a). But this is only part of the picture, as, in 
turn, the average monthly cost of a contract in the UK has decreased. While in the last quarter 
of 2008, 55 % of contracts cost £30 or more per month, by the first quarter of 2010, only 39 
% were in that price bracket, and by the first quarter of 2011, it was only 28 %; at the same 
time, the proportion of contracts costing less than £30 per month increased correspondingly 
(Ofcom 2013, p. 96 fig. 99). 
The reverse trend can be found in Canada. As discussed above, the majority of contracts used 
to have an initial commitment period of 36 months (CBC News 2013), which was lowered 
due to the CRTC requirement of a maximum 24-month initial commitment period (Telecom 
Regulatory Policy 2013, para. 220). This also affected the price. Prices for consumers with 
lower than average consumption rose by roughly 16 % after the introduction of the Wireless 
Code (Wall Communications Inc 2014). However, for average consumption users, the cost 
remained steady between 2013 and 2014, and higher than average consumption contracts (ie 
CAN$80 and above) dropped from an average price of CAN$93 in 2013 to CAN$80 in 2014 
(Wall Communications Inc 2014). 
Prices for mobile phone services have continually fallen in Germany too; by 2.3 – 3.5% per 
year between 2007 and 2012 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017) What this means in absolute 
terms can be illustrated by comparing OECD (2011) and OECD (2013), with a snapshot of 
the prices in August 2010 and August 2012, where the price fell for a bundle of 100 calls 
from US$42.63 to US$30.88. 
It would appear, therefore, that the market in the UK behaved in the expected manner, and 
that, because the market moved towards longer 24-month contracts, the cost per month was 
reduced, resulting in a static total cost over the duration of the contract. Price decreases in 
Canada (for some contract types) and Germany suggest a different picture though: here, 
prices dropped even in circumstances of shorter, or unchanged, contract terms, suggesting a 
general drop in prices for wireless telephone services due to a more saturated, mature and 
established market (OECD 2011). 
 
3. Technology 
One of the factors that influences consumers’ behaviour is the technology that is often linked 
to the mobile phone contract. The mobile phone, as a means of communication, has seen a 
remarkable transformation in terms of consumer usage, as well as technological 
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advancement. Mobile phones are being used more often, and for different purposes, such as 
mobile browsing (Nielson Company 2013). A long contract duration, such as the 36-month 
contracts that dominated the market in Canada, might have rendered devices obsolete before 
the end of the contract term due to the outdated hardware (Telecom Regulatory Policy 2013 
para 216). It is clear that the change in usage occurred when there was a shift from feature 
phones (no touchscreen) to smartphones (touchscreen and use of apps) (Nielson Company 
2013 p. 9). Consumers therefore needed to strike a balance between the desire to keep up 
with the latest technology (i.e., frequent changing of the handset) and the increased price of 
the handsets. Prior to the release of the first iPhone, the cost of mobile phones (e.g., Motorola 
Razr, Blackberry Pearl) had dropped to an all-time low (Timetoast 2015). The release of the 
first iPhone meant that consumers were faced with an increase in the cost for their handset, 
which is likely to have influenced them to enter into contracts with a longer initial 
commitment period in order to spread the cost over a longer period. 
In the first year of the release of the iPhone, the number of 18-month contracts (the once 
dominant length) fell in the UK, with a large increase in one-month contracts and a slight 
increase in 24-month contracts (Ofcom 2013). The increase in one-month contracts is likely 
to be due to the fact that consumers decided to buy the iPhone without a service provider’s 
subsidy and then added the mobile phone contract. The consistent rise in the popularity of 24-
month contracts indicates that consumers have since opted to spread the cost of the handset 
over a longer period. 
This supports the suggestion that the increase in the cost of the mobile phones through the 
introduction of smartphones has contributed to the increase of the initial commitment period. 
It is assumed that the trend of mobile phone replacement cycle is similar in the UK and 
Canada, where the contract does not automatically renew, and the consumer remains on the 
same tariff. 
A further factor influencing price is the investment in the infrastructure required from mobile 
phone operators. However, the assumption based on the general trends shown in the OECD 
international comparison (OECD 2011) must be that the level of investment in the 
infrastructure, though not the same in amount, must have been the same from one year to the 
next. We would also expect the investment to increase (in terms of percentage) in the same 
way across each of the jurisdictions when new technologies, such as 4G, were introduced. A 
related issue is the cost of spectrum which differs between jurisdictions but is an expression 
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of the move towards private management of public airwaves. These elements therefore are 
not taken into account in our assessment. 
A further factor that influences the cost and could therefore have an impact on the length of 
the contract is the geography of a country. In Canada, it is accepted that the running of the 
network is more expensive due to the vast geographical space the network providers must 
cover. In the UK, the space is comparatively small. It could therefore be argued that the 
higher overall cost of operating the network has an impact on the demand for longer term 
contracts. In other words, the higher overall cost of running the network in Canada means 
that consumer demand is significantly lower (due to high overall cost of the contract itself) 
than in the UK. However, this must be doubted on the basis that the highest charges were 
recorded in Germany, which is far more densely populated than Canada, but less than the 
UK, with a maximum length of 24 months. Also, it would seem from the above statistics that 
there has not been a significant increase in the monthly cost of the contract in Canada after 
the introduction of a 24-month maximum initial commitment period. It is therefore argued 
here that although the providers claimed (Middleton 2011) that the geography is responsible 
for the high cost and so justified the fact that they only offered 36-month contracts, it was in 
fact the lack of competition which led to the high initial commitment period (Telecom 
Regulatory Policy 2013, para 202). This is partly substantiated by the fact that in some cases 
the consumer may not even be aware that a provider belongs to a larger telecommunications 
network (Chu 2009). In the other countries discussed here, lack of competition does not 
appear to be a major factor as there are three or four operators with a market share of more 
than 10% (UK: BT 2018; Germany: VATM 2018; USA: FierceWireless 2018). 
 
III. Renewal 
Another factor influencing long-term contractual relationships is the possibility of bringing 
the agreement to an end or, alternatively, the option of preventing its expiry by renewing it. 
While the initial commitment period of the contract is a primary concern for consumers when 
entering into a mobile phone contract, the fate of the agreement at the expiry of the initial 
period is of key importance for the provider. Even if the initial period is fairly short, an 
automatic renewal by the same term burdens the consumer, who might not have considered 
such an automatic extension, while at the same time benefitting the service provider, who 
retains a customer for another fixed term. Renewal on unchanged terms might constitute a 
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disadvantage for the provider though if it cannot adapt the contract price to price increases or 
other changed circumstances (see below, for the provider’s possibilities to unilaterally modify 
contract terms). A related issue is the ability of a user to terminate the agreement before the 
expiry of the initial term, and what this might cost. 
Provisions in long-term contracts relating to their expiry are designed in different ways. 
Contracts can be entered into for an undefined period of time, giving the parties the right to 
terminate the agreement by giving notice. Contracts can also be entered into for a fixed term, 
ending automatically on expiry of the term. Fixed-term contracts, rather than coming to an 
end, might be automatically renewed for the same, or another defined, term. In the utilities 
sector, contracts tend to extend for an indefinite period via the standard variable rate, though 
this may not be the most efficient for consumers (Bisping and Dodsworth 2017). There are 
benefits for both parties to such a practice: in return for accepting a renewable long-term 
commitment, the customer might get a lower price than they would have been able to obtain 
in a one-off or short-term transaction. It might also be in the consumer’s interest to have a 
continuous supply of goods or services without the necessity of having to look for alternative 
means of supply. In mobile phone contracts, in particular, the consumer has a vital interest in 
retaining their telephone number, as informing all contacts that there has been a change to 
that number can both be costly and time-intensive. To this end, mobile number portability has 
been introduced across all markets, in the EU this right is now enshrined in Council Directive 
2018/1972/EU, art. 106). Extension of the contract benefits the provider by guaranteeing a 
customer, which in turn also guarantees a certain income. This allows the provider to 
amortise the initial investment in acquiring and signing up the new customer (Bar-Gill 2012). 
If renewal occurs completely automatically, there are no further transaction costs involved at 
the extension stage. The benefits come at a price to both parties though: the customer is 
bound for a long term and cannot take advantage of later cheaper offers; additionally, they 
might not be able to update handsets as frequently as they might wish. Changes in personal 
circumstances cannot be accommodated by changed contractual arrangements, unless the 
provider agrees, which they will typically only do for more expensive price plans. The 
provider, too, might face changed circumstances without being able to reflect them by 
adapting contract terms. They might be bound to honour contract terms for a longer term and 
at a lower rate than is commercially viable.  
 
1. The Law 
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The picture as to the regulation of automatic contract renewal differs considerably across the 
jurisdictions under review here. Within the EU, a further harmonisation will be achieved once 
the Electronic Communications Code (Council Directive 2018/1972/EU) has been 
implemented in the Member States as art. 106(3) requires that after “automatic prolongation 
[…] end-users are entitled to terminate the contract at any time with a maximum one-month 
notice period”. This will require future changes to the laws discussed below; only English 
law seems compliant with this provision at the time of writing. 
In Germany, contract terms stipulating automatic renewal by another fixed term are 
permitted, even in pre-formulated standard contracts, as long as the maximum renewal period 
of one year as laid down in BGB §309(9)(b) is not exceeded.3 This occurs without the 
consumer’s explicit consent at the time of the extension. Renewal operates on the terms of the 
initial contract and even though no new handset is provided, the price remains the same; this 
has been held to be compatible with unfair terms legislation (AG Munich 2017, p. 62). The 
burden is on the consumer to give notice to terminate the agreement before expiry of the 
notice period. This approach is not, however, representative of the civil law tradition more 
generally. The two systems most closely related to German law, Austria and Switzerland, do 
not allow automatic renewal unless the consumer has received a reminder about the extension 
not too long before the end of the initial period (Maissen 2012). Similarly, under French law, 
the consumer is only bound by an extension for a fixed period if the professional has sent a 
reminder of the extension within a one- to three-month period prior to the extension. If no 
such reminder was sent, the consumer can cancel the agreement at any time under Consumer 
Code, art. L136-1 (OECD 2011, pp. 94, 99). 
A sector-specific modification has recently brought German law somewhat more in line with 
the dominant civil law position. According to the Telecommunications Transparency Order 
2015 § 5, the provider must state on every monthly statement the end date of the agreement 
and the last date on which notice of termination can be given in order to avoid automatic 
renewal. This falls short of an explicit reminder though, as a notice on a statement is more 
likely to be overlooked than a separate notification. Nonetheless, for the first time there is a 
sector-specific provision that takes some of the burden of having to remember renewal dates 
away from the consumer. This falls short of the prohibition of automatic renewal beyond one 
                                                     
3 This provision covers long term contracts relating to the “regular delivery of goods or the regular performance 
of services.” It is also applicable to cases of bundled performances, such as the provision of handset with 
subsequent regular provision of services (OLG Hamm). Even if §309 Nr. 9 should be inapplicable, the same result 
would be achieved by applying the general clause in BGB § 307. 
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month that the EU Telecoms Code requires as of 21 December 2020 (Council Directive 
2018/1972 art. 124(1)). 
In the UK, legislative changes based on EU law have taken a similar stance on automatic 
renewal, presuming the unfairness of such clauses unless the consumer has a right to indicate 
that he does not wish such renewal and the deadline to give notice is not unreasonably early 
(Consumer Rights Act 2015, sch 2(9)). In principle, this could lead to contracting mechanisms 
as found in Germany or France.  The telecoms regulator, OFCOM, has laid down stricter 
rules for telecoms contracts though and requires the consumer’s explicit consent to an 
extension by another fixed period. If such consent is missing, the contract is converted into a 
contract of indefinite duration which can be terminated by giving one month’s notice (Ofcom 
2015a, s. 9.6). In Canada, the Wireless Code similarly provides for extension on a monthly 
basis only (Telecom Regulatory Policy 2013, § G.6); where the customer is incentivised by 
receiving a new handset into accepting a new fixed term, their explicit consent must be 
obtained (ibid, para 277). This appears the same in practice as the future EU solution in the 
Electronic Communications Code (Council Directive 2018/1972); although art. 105 does not 
mention explicit consent, such consent would constitute a new contract which would not be 
an automatically prolonged contract that is subject to cancellation by one-month notice. The 
consumer has the right to further opt out of the automatic extension on a monthly basis (ibid, 
para 275). Before the introduction of the Wireless Code, there was no legal basis in most of 
Canada’s provinces regulating the automatic or unwanted extension of consumer contracts. 
The courts have subjected relevant clauses to a general test of good faith and honesty, with 
the associated problems of uncertainty and interpretive difficulties arising from such vague 
tests. Only in some provinces do statutory consumer protection measures apply. 
In the US, many states allow automatic renewal only after a reminder by the service provider. 
The Illinois Automatic Contract Renewal Act section 10(b) stipulates that any extension by 
more than one month of a contract with an initial duration of 12 months or more is subject to 
the provider reminding the customer of the renewal between 60 and 30 days prior to renewal. 
Such notice has to include a reminder of the possibility of cancelation and explain that 
otherwise the contract will renew, and give advice on how to cancel the contract (815 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 601/10 (2010)). In Florida, too, any extension of a contract of an original length 
of 12 months or more, depends on the provider reminding the consumer of the impeding 
renewal between 60 and 30 days before the cancelation deadline (Fla. Stat. § 501.165(2)(b)). 
The position is similar in New York (NY General Obligations Law, § 5-903) and North 
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Carolina (NC Gen. Stat. 2011, §75-41(a)(3), where the deadlines for the reminder a slightly 
different and calculated from the cancelation deadline (NY) or the date of automatic renewal 
(NC), and in California (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§17600-6 (2009)). These US solutions are 
not dissimilar to the position taken in France (Code de la Consommation, art. L136-1; see 
OECD 2011, p. 94). 
 
2. Business influences 
Renewal on the same terms as during the initial commitment period has obvious commercial 
benefits for the mobile phone provider. During the initial period, the monthly price frequently 
contains an element for a subsidised handset. The initial contract is designed to amortise the 
cost of the handset during the initial period. Renewal without exchange of handset thus leads 
to a windfall for the provider who continues to receive payments for a handset that is already 
paid off. 
As the renewal occurs on the same terms there is, at least hypothetically, also a risk of the 
provider being tied to a contract on terms that have become commercially unattractive. 
Rather than being able to adjust the contract to reflect the increased cost, the provider would 
have to continue on now unattractive terms. On such an assumption, it might be explained 
why Germany has a higher price level than the other countries under consideration here: 
given German law’s hostility towards allowing unilateral price increases, providers have to 
anticipate future cost increases and charge a comparably high price from the beginning. As 
stated above, this hurdle is mainly hypothetical, as it can be overcome by the provider giving 
notice of a price increase effective from the date of the renewal. It is then the consumer’s 
decision whether to allow the contract to renew on the changed terms, or whether to 
discontinue it. One reason why providers might be reluctant to notify customers of price 
increases is that this operates like a reminder of the impeding renewal, alerting the mobile 
phone user to the fact that they are in a position to terminate the agreement and look for 
alternatives elsewhere. 
 
3. Comparison with early termination 
Similar questions arise regarding the possibility of exiting the contract before the expiry of 
the initial term. In German law, early termination is not possible unless the contract is 
modified by the provider. The consumer is bound for the entire period they have agreed to, 
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unless the service recipient moves house and the telephony services are not available at the 
new address (TKG §46(8). Even if the consumer avails themselves of the possibility to port 
the mobile phone number to another provider, the existing contract will continue, and another 
phone number will be allocated: § 46(4) TKG provides that ‘the existing contract between the 
user and the previous provider … is unaffected [by the mobile phone number porting].’ The 
consumer, in effect, is thus obliged to make all payments under the agreement. The contract 
continues to operate between the parties – pacta sunt servanda. In addition, a disincentive to 
porting one’s mobile phone number to another provider is that, unlike most other countries, 
where the porting service is free, fees of up to €29.95 may be charged by the previous 
provider for releasing the mobile phone number; even higher fees were charged, up to €116, 
before the Telecoms Regulation Authority introduced this cap in 2004 (see 
Bundesnetzagentur 2004). This mirrors the general payment structure prevalent in Germany 
that services are paid for individually on the basis of actual use rather than via hidden default 
costs.4 In the UK, typically no fees for number porting are charged, although the industry 
regulation would allow charges that are ‘cost oriented and based on the incremental costs of 
providing portability’ as long this is reasonable (Ofcom 2015a, para. 18.5). As a consequence 
of the Electronic Communications Code (Council Directive 2018/1972) art. 106(4) in the 
future no direct charges can be applied to end-users in EU Member States. 
In contrast to the continued existence of the contract in German law, in the common law 
jurisdictions, consumers can, in principle, exit their agreements before the expiry of the term. 
This constitutes repudiation of the contract and gives rise to a claim for damages by the 
service provider against the customer. In practice, the amount of damages is usually laid 
down in the contractual agreement as an early termination fee (Ofcom 2015b, para 69). In the 
UK, this fee is calculated by reference to the monthly subscription price multiplied by the 
number of months remaining in the agreement (Ofcom 2015b, para 58). OFCOM, the UK 
telecoms regulator, has identified the early termination fee as a default charge, payable as a 
result of the consumer’s breach of contract, not a price payable in exchange for the service 
                                                     
4 See Kenny (2011), p. 45 for a comparison of bank charges. In Germany, typically, current bank accounts cost a 
small monthly subscription fee, and many banking transactions attract small service fees. Overdrafts, on the other 
hand, are charged a relatively low rate of interest and often do not incur additional fees; where lump sum fees are 
charged, BGH (2016) has declared that these breach unfair term. In the UK, most current accounts are free of 
charge, as are cash withdrawals and other banking transactions, which are paid for by hefty overdraft fees and 
high overdraft interest. The national courts have taken opposing views as to the nature of certain bank fees and 
the resulting possibility to assess their fairness under unfair terms legislation. The UK Supreme Court has held 
overdraft fees to constitute payment for the banking services and, as such, not subject to the assessment for fairness 
(Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National); In Germany, ancillary banking fees have repeatedly held to be subject 
to the assessment for fairness (BGH 1993; BGH 2001; BGH 2005).  
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provided. The charge is therefore subject to the assessment for fairness under the term control 
provisions of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (Ofcom 2015b, para 73). The charge thus must 
be a fair reflection of the provider’s anticipated factual loss. In practice, providers charge an 
amount equivalent to the remaining monthly payments with a discretionary reduction if that 
amount is paid in full. It is doubtful that this is fully compliant with the fairness requirement, 
as no discounts are specified for the costs that have been avoided or any other savings the 
provider has made as a result of the customer’s early termination (Ofcom 2015b, para 80). 
In Canada, the fee charged for early termination is limited to the value of a subsidised 
handset and must be reduced in accordance with the remaining duration of the initial term 
(Telecom Regulatory Policy 2013, G-2) or, where no subsidised handset was part of the 
contract, 10 % of the minimum monthly charge for the remaining months of the contract up 
to a maximum of CAN$50 (Telecom Regulatory Policy 2013, G-3). The Canadian position is 
thus much more beneficial for consumers, in particular in contracts without a subsidised 
handset. Here, the contrast with the UK is the greatest, where the monthly subscription price 
remains payable even in contracts where no handset was provided as part of the agreement, or 
where the service agreement and handset credit agreement are legally separate (Fitchard 
2015).  
In the US, early termination charges used to be set as fixed amounts that remained unchanged 
during the course of the agreement. This practice has changed after several lawsuits were 
brought against mobile phone providers (Ayyad v Sprint Spectrum L.P.; Larson v Sprint 
Nextel Corp) and fees are now typically dependent on the type of handset provided under the 
agreement (standard or smartphones) and the length of the remaining contract period. The 
difference between this and the English or Canadian position is that the early termination fee 
is calculated without reference to the monthly payments due under the mobile phone 
agreement. There are thus very evident differences among common law jurisdictions when it 
comes to the calculation of the early termination fee. The English position is based on general 
contract law principles and focuses on what the provider might have recovered in an action 
for the price or damages. The Canadian position puts competition at the centre of the 
argument. Here, it is considered important that an early termination fee can be charged even 
for contracts where no subsidised handset was provided, as ‘banning an early cancelation fee 
in the above-mentioned circumstances could reduce consumer choice by reducing the 
incentive for [service providers] to offer service plans featuring discounts or lower rates in 
return for customers signing fixed-term contracts’ (Telecom Regulatory Policy 2013, para. 
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227). The overall consideration is that ‘the amount of the early cancelation fee should be 
limited to ensure that it does not constitute a switching barrier’ (ibid).  
The stark contrast with the German position is that the contract is brought to an end. In 
Germany, the contract survives the attempt to prematurely terminate it and the consumer is 
required to make all contractual payments until the end of the minimum term. As with 
automatic renewal, German law upholds the tie between the parties created by their 
agreement. The common law finds it easier to allow parties to exit an agreement and uses 
early termination fees as a way of ensuring the provider’s commercial expectation is not 
undermined. The differences in the amount that can be charged in the jurisdictions under 
discussion appears to be a consequence of the varying policies pursued by local lawmakers. 
As the purpose of the Canadian Wireless Code is to boost competition in a market that was 
perceived as lacking competition, exiting an agreement was made as cheap as possible, while 
still allowing some compensation for the provider. In the UK, the policy focuses more on the 
contractual bargain struck by the parties and therefore solely subjects the term providing for 
an early termination charge to the assessment of fairness under unfair terms legislation. The 
same appears to be true in the US, where, in the absence of specific legislation on unfair 
terms, the general doctrine of contractual penalties is used to reduce previously fixed penalty 
payments to a prorated system. Penalty clauses are unenforceable in the Restatement (2d) of 
Contracts§ 356 and UCC § 2-718. Both instruments distinguish liquidated damages clauses 
as clauses providing for ‘an amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual 
loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss’ (Restatement (2d) of Contracts 
§ 356(1)); the wording of the UCC is similar but goes on to include ‘the inconvenience or 
non-feasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy.’ 
 
IV. Modification 
The last factor influencing the overall balance of rights and duties between the parties is the 
possibility of modifying the terms of the agreement during the initial (or a subsequent) 
commitment period. At the outset, we need to remember that neither party has the power, 
once a contract has been validly created, to unilaterally change the content of the agreement. 
This might cause hardship to the provider where there is a substantial increase in cost 
associated with providing the telephone services contracted for. Conversely, the consumer 
benefits from knowing that during the initial commitment period at least there will be no 
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price increases. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, though, the provider cannot 
change the price, or any other term, during the duration of the agreement. The key question is 
thus to what extent do the different jurisdictions considered here permit providers to include 
contractual terms allowing for the possibility of a modification of the contract terms, in 
particular, a price increase? Within the EU, there are two levels of control of contract terms 
purporting to allowing the provider subsequently to increase the price of the mobile phone 
services offered. In general contract law, the unfair contract terms directive presumes the 
unfairness of  a term in standard form contracts allowing a price increase ‘without … giving 
the consumer the corresponding right to cancel the contract if the final price is too high in 
relation to the price agreed when the contract was concluded’ (Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 
Annex 1(1)), which has been interpreted by the European Court of Justice in RWE Vertrieb 
AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV (2013), as allowing price variation 
clauses if ‘the contract sets out in a transparent fashion the reason for and method of the 
variation of those charges, so that the consumer can foresee, on the basis of clear, intelligible 
criteria, the alterations that may be made by those charges’. At industry level, Council 
Directive 2018/1972 art. 105(4) provides that ‘end-users have the right to terminate their 
contract without incurring any further cost upon notice of changes in the contractual 
conditions proposed by the provider.’ The predecessor to this provision (Council Directive 
2002/22 art. 20(2)) was interpreted by the CJEU as not applying to a term in a contract that 
links price increases to “changes in an objective consumer price index compiled by a public 
institution” (Verein für Konsumenteninformation v A1 Telekom Austria AG, para. 26). Both 
provisions have found a different reception in the Member States. 
In the UK, under general contract law, price increases in mobile phone contracts are mostly 
regarded as acceptable. Under the Consumer Rights Act 2015, terms may be regarded as 
unfair if they allow ‘the supplier to alter the terms of the agreement unilaterally without a 
valid reason which is specified in the contract,’ in particular if the effect is ‘to increase the 
price … without giving the consumer the right to cancel the contract if the final price is too 
high in relation to the price agreed when the contract was concluded.’5 The body in charge of 
giving effect to consumer legislation, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), issued 
guidance that ‘[t]erms which permit increases linked to a relevant published price index such 
as the RPI are likely to be acceptable’ (Ofcom 2015b, para. 12.4). The Court of Appeal held 
that price increases generally would be permissible if they were ‘part of a carefully balanced 
                                                     
5 Previously UTCCR sch. 2, no. 1 paras. j, l.  
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review procedure’ which had been fairly applied in the instant case (Du Plessis v Fontygary 
Leisure Parks Ltd, paras. 49, 52). In general, there is thus some room for contract terms 
allowing price changes, as long as the process for determining the change is spelt out with 
sufficient clarity in the contract term.  
The corresponding provision relating to price increases in the sector-specific regulations is 
contained in General Condition 9.6, which applies only to ‘modifications likely to be of 
material detriment’ to the consumer. The position originally taken by the Telecoms Regulator 
was that price increases in line with inflation were not of material detriment to the consumer. 
In January 2013, the Telecoms Regulator OFCOM launched a consultation and concluded 
that price changes were likely to be of material detriment to the consumer as ‘[t]he core 
subscription price is one of the most important factors in the subscriber’s choice of contract. 
It is likely to be the most important aspect of one of the key terms of the contract’ (Ofcom 
2013b, para. A1.10). For the purposes of the sector-specific regulation, OFCOM does now 
consider terms allowing discretionary price increases as being to the material detriment of the 
consumer; by contrast, contractually agreed price increases, whereby it is clear that at a 
certain point in time the price will increase by a stated amount, or by a stated percentage in 
line with an inflationary measure (such as the retail price index, RPI) are not considered to be 
of material detriment to the consumer (Ofcom 2013b, para. A1.14), which mirrors the 
position taken by the European Court of Justice in Verein für Konsumenteninformation v A1 
Telekom Austria AG. This is dependent on ‘the relevant price terms being sufficiently 
prominent and transparent that the subscriber can properly be said to have agreed on an 
informed basis, at the point of sale, to the relevant tiered price(s). Where that is so, the 
application of the agreed price(s) at the relevant time(s) would not be a modification of the 
amount he or she has agreed and is bound to pay’ (Ofcom 2013b, para. A1.15). This approach 
is in line with the approach taken under the general law and emphasises the knowledge of the 
consumer of the possibility of a price increase, and the adherence of the supplier to the stated 
procedure to determine the increased price. In sum, it is relatively straightforward to include a 
term regarding price increases in mobile phone contracts in the UK. The fact that mobile 
phone contract prices are lower in the UK than in any of the other markets under discussion 
might suggest that the relative ease with which providers can increase the contract price leads 
to restraint when the initial contract price is set. 
In Canada, the Wireless Code now prohibits any changes to key contract terms (content of 
service, monthly charge, contract term) without the consumer’s informed and express 
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consent, and the consumer has the right to refuse the proposed change (Telecom Regulatory 
Policy 2013, paras 92-93). The prohibition of changes to the contract terms, unless they 
solely benefit the consumer, is based on the finding that ‘requiring the customer to either 
accept the change or cancel the contract, which may involve the customer incurring an early 
cancelation fee, is insufficient to address consumer concerns’ (Telecom Regulatory Policy 
2013, para 88). This line of reasoning is not entirely convincing as it would be perfectly 
possible to say that cancelation on grounds of a change to core contract terms does not trigger 
the early termination fee. This option, it appears, was not considered when the regulatory 
policy was developed. Consequently, the Canadian position is, again, very generous towards 
the consumer and forces the provider to honour the terms of an agreement that might not be 
as profitable as expected. In contrast to the UK position, though, providers might factor in 
potential future price increases into the original contract price explaining, at least in part, the 
overall higher prices in Canada. 
In the US, where there is no sector-specific regulation of the issue, an adverse, material 
change to the contract terms justifies termination of the agreement under all operators’ terms 
of contracting. There is some debate about unilateral modification clauses in contracts in 
general (Bar-Gill & Davis 2010; Horowitz 2006; Watkins 2009) and for credit agreements in 
particular. For the latter type of agreement, federal legislation has in narrowly defined 
circumstances outlawed (Truth in Lending Act § 226.5b(f)(3)) the use of unilateral 
modification clauses and otherwise provided specific notification requirements (Credit Card 
Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act 2009, s. 101(a) (1)). State law has proved 
rather accommodating to banks’ wishes to unilaterally alter terms (Alces 2009). Outside the 
realm of credit agreements, there appear to be no statutes of general application dealing with 
unilateral modification of contracts; Alces (2009, p. 1130) mentions as the only sector-
specific example landlord-tenant legislation. Courts have occasionally employed general 
contract doctrines instead. In Powertel Inc v Bexley (1999), the doctrine of unconscionability 
was used to strike out a compulsory arbitration clause that the service provider had inserted 
into customers’ contracts, relying on a change-of-terms clause in the original agreement. The 
test for unconscionability was included in the UCC (Uniform Commercial Code § 302) and 
has been refined in case law (Knapp 2013); it has subsequently been absorbed in Restatement 
(2d) Contracts § 208. Unconscionability has been widely used by the courts to deal with 
mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts (Knapp 2013); the mere combination of such a 
clause and a change in terms provision in the contract does not per so render mandatory 
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arbitration clauses unconscionable as the US Court of Appeals  for the 5th Circuit held in a 
class action against mobile phone providers (Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc v Cingular Wireless 
LLC, 2004). In many respects US-style unconscionability resembles the general European 
test for the assessment of fairness of terms as applied in the UK, France and Germany. In the 
leading case Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Co (1965), unconscionability was taken to 
be present where there is ‘absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties 
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favourable to the other party’. This test 
contains procedural and substantive elements (Leff 1967, p. 487), both of which must be 
present (Garrett v Janiewski 1985) on a sliding scale (A&M Produce Co. v FMC Corp., 
1982). In standard form contracts, the adhesive nature of the contract in itself satisfies the 
procedural element (Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 2001). Herein lies the similarity 
to the European approach, where Article 3 of the Unfair Terms Directive provides: ‘A 
contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, 
contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' 
rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.’6 The 
procedural element is the limitation to terms that have not been individually negotiated; and 
the additional requirements, such as transparency as per Council Directive 93/13/EEC art 5. 
The substantive requirement is the significant imbalance in rights and obligations to the 
detriment of the consumer. A difference in the European system is that this general clause has 
been further concretised by a list of clauses that the legislator has identified as being 
potentially unfair. One of those presumed unfair terms is a clause allowing discretionary price 
increases (Council Directive 93/13/EEC annex 1(l)). In the UK, as was seen above, it was 
held that price increases were permissible if the procedure for determining the new price had 
been clear and had been applied fairly in the instant case.  
The position is rather different in German law. First, there is no sector-specific regulation 
regarding mobile phone contracts; the Telecommunications Act does not contain any 
provisions on pricing. The general provisions regarding price escalation clauses in contracts 
are based on the same European rules as in the UK but have been differently interpreted. 
§ 308 Nr. 4 of the German Civil Code prohibits unilateral modification clauses in standard 
terms, unless agreeing to such a term can be reasonably expected from the consumer, taking 
into account the interests of the other party to the contract. This prohibition covers clauses 
                                                     
6 Council Directive 93/13 implemented (and extended to individually negotiated terms) in the United Kingdom in 
Consumer Rights Act 2015, ss 63-76 (the previous implementation in the UTCCR reg 5 followed the European 
text more closely); implemented in Germany in BGB §§ 305, 307.  
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modifying the supplier’s obligations only, not the price payable for it. In Germany, clauses 
which are not individually negotiated which allow for a price increase are held to be void 
where they are ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith […] unreasonably disadvantageous’ 
to the consumer (BGB § 307). With respect to price increase clauses, German courts apply a 
very high threshold (Atamer 2017, p. 626), criteria that ‘no market player seems to be able to 
fulfil anymore’ (Rott 2013). The consumer has a right to terminate the agreement if the price 
increase is fractionally above the increase of the general cost of living (BGH 1984). In order 
to comply with the transparency requirement, such clauses are further only valid ‘if the 
professional’s power to increase the price is made dependent on an increase in cost, and the 
specific cost elements as well as their respective weighing are laid open in the calculation of 
the total price’ (ibid). The mobile phone supplier thus ought to disclose vital commercial 
information – its pricing calculations – in order to achieve a price escalation clause that can 
lead to a price increase without a corresponding right on the consumer’s side to terminate the 
agreement. In light of the strict requirements, academic commentators go a step further and 
say that the consumer must have a right to cancellation for every price increase (Zschieschack 
2018). The recently introduced English practice of price rises agreed in-advance in line with a 
general price index would fall foul of the general prohibition of price index clauses in 
contracts in Germany (Preisklauselgesetz), as these are seen as contributing to inflation, a 
wider societal consideration rather than a mechanism of consumer protection, which 
nevertheless has an impact on consumer contracts (Dodsworth 2015). Under this Act, 
automatic price escalation clauses are allowed in very narrow circumstances only, and if so, 
authorisation requirements are imposed for several areas of commerce. Prior to the 
introduction of the Euro, the prohibition of automatic price escalation clauses was even 
stricter under the Price Clause Order (Preisklauselverordnung 1998). 
The position regarding unilateral modification, in particular price escalation, is thus a diverse 
one. Canada and Germany de facto do not allow such clauses, but for very different reasons 
and by providing for different regimes. In Canada, the consumer is protected from unforeseen 
price rises and at the same time from having to make new arrangements as the contract has to 
be continued on the previous terms if the consumer does not agree to the increase. In 
Germany, the consumer is granted an extraordinary right to terminate the agreement in case 
of a price increase, unless such increase meets the very strict requirements of a permissible 
increase. This may be an explanation for the higher prices found in Germany in relation to 
mobile phone contracts. 
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V. Trade-offs between the Factors 
This paper has discussed the three features which define a long-term contractual relation from 
a regulatory point of view: initial commitment period, renewal and modification. It was 
shown that each of the features is shaped by a plethora of factors from technological 
advancements to cultural and political beliefs. It further transpires that although each of the 
features, if compared separately, provide for differing levels of consumer protection, once 
taken together, the level of protection (whether through regulation or market pressure) in each 
of the jurisdictions is similar, unless there has been drastic regulatory interference (which 
then has a significant impact on the price). For example, where a jurisdiction gives more 
power to the service provider with regard to the initial commitment period, it tends to provide 
the consumer with more protection in relation to the renewal and/or modification. Certain 
increased protective features are traded off against lower levels of protection regarding a 
different aspect of the contract. These findings can be transferred to other types of long-term 
contracts, because the commercial interests are similar to those in the mobile phone industry. 
Differences arise only where the regulation of a particular market pursues very strong policy 
aims specific to that market, such as the introduction of greater competition in the Canadian 
mobile phone market. 
The balancing effect can be illustrated by looking at the initial commitment period in 
Germany which has been 24 months since before the age of mobile phones. German law 
allows the service provider to renew the contract after the 24 months (so long as the 
consumer agreed to this in the initial contract) for an additional 12 months without any duty 
to notify the consumer. However, the service provider will not (apart from the very restrictive 
option mentioned above) be able to modify the terms during the contract. In this example the 
renewal in favour of the service provider is traded off against the rules on modification 
weighed in favour of the consumer.  
A similar trade-off is also apparent in the English approach. The initial commitment period is 
limited to 24 months, though this is a European influence, and the service provider can 
reasonably easily modify the terms of the contract. However, there is no possibility for the 
provider to renew the contract without express consent from the customer beyond a one 
month rolling basis. Compared to Germany, in the UK mobile phone contracts renew less 
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easily but can more easily be modified, striking a balance between the parties’ interests that is 
not far removed from the balance struck by German law.  
The position in the US reveals a similar approach to that in Germany although it is noticeable 
that this is not due to regulation but to how the industry has reacted over time. Providers can, 
without the consumers explicit consent, renew the contract. There is no legal limit on the 
initial length of the contract, though unconscionability may allow a review of an excessive 
initial commitment period, which would explain why there are no consumer contracts offered 
for a period of more than 24 months. Although technically there is the opportunity to modify 
the contract, it seems that the uncertainty, especially in light of the doctrine of 
unconscionability discussed above, means that in practice providers will not make use of it. 
This means that despite specific regulation the balance of interests, while different in detail, 
consumer protection is effectively in line with that found in Germany and England.   
By contrast, Canada is an example of regulatory intervention which has given consumers 
more comprehensive rights. This is a consequence of the imbalance in favour of the service 
provider that had existed before regulatory intervention, and that the real motivation behind 
the intervention was to create greater competition in the telecoms market. A consequence of 
the focus on consumer interests is that package prices in Canada remained high until 2016 
(NGL Nordicity Group Ltd 2017, p. 80, fig C.2). The US, on the other hand, is an example of 
how a similar level of consumer protection to that found in Germany and England is reached 
without much regulatory intervention. 
The knowledge that there are three factors that shape the nature of a long-term, consumer-
provider relationship will help in identifying how to regulate, if at all, each element. 
However, it is also important to consider why countries may have decided to directly or 
indirectly regulate the long-term relationship in the way that they do. The next section will 
determine each jurisdiction’s choice of weighting in relation to these factors.  
 
VI. Policies 
Underlying every legal rule is a policy aim pursued by the lawmaker. Here, we will discuss 
the different policies adopted in the jurisdiction under discussion. At first sight, it could be 
argued that the policies of the different jurisdictions are merely based on their legal heritage, 
ie whether they belong to the civil or common law family. Three of the countries, the UK, 
Canada and the US, share a common heritage in form of the common law, which might 
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suggest that they are influenced by shared legal principles, which in turn may better explain 
the difference in approach to that taken in Germany. However, any differentiation into legal 
families (Zweigert and Kötz 1988) is overly simplistic (Glenn 2012), and wrongly 
emphasises perceived similarities rather than the very real differences between countries 
belonging to the same legal family.  
This is clear when we consider that there is no generally accepted civil law position on 
automatic renewal and Germany appears quite alone in rather generously (for the provider) 
allowing automatic extension by up to one year without the consumer’s explicit consent. The 
recently introduced more consumer-friendly measures (Transparency Order) only oblige the 
provider to mention on each statement, the beginning and end dates of the agreement, as well 
as the last possible day to cancel it. This shows that within the civil law family alone, two 
different approaches can be traced (OECD 2011, p. 96; Dodsworth et al. 2014). The first is 
the business-friendly approach taken by German law; the second, and dominant approach, is 
the imposition on the business of a duty to remind the customer of the impending renewal as 
found in, e.g., French and Austrian (Maissen 2012) law. While there are thus clear 
differences within the civil law countries, it is noticeable that none of them go so far as to 
require the customer’s explicit consent, at the time of renewal, for such a renewal to take 
effect, as long as the customer agreed to potential renewal when entering into the contract. A 
similar position is that taken in many US states. This means that although the division 
between civil law and common law families may explain the differences in approach to a 
certain extent, the divergence of approaches within those families tend to suggest that there 
are other factors which have influenced the legislative decisions in this area.  
The common law position is similarly split, as in the UK and Canada the yardstick that is 
now employed for renewal is the consumer’s explicit consent, whereas in the US, reminders 
by the provider are prevalent. It is noticeable though that in the UK and Canada this shift in 
policy was introduced on an industry-specific regulatory basis, rather than as a matter of 
general law (Ofcom 2015a; Telecom Regulatory Policy 2013). It is further of interest to note 
that the motivation behind the policy appears to be rather different in the two countries.  
The CRTC analyses automatic renewal in the following terms: ‘The lack of transparency 
regarding contract extensions is a key concern for consumers. This lack of transparency can 
be detrimental to a dynamic market since it acts as a barrier to switching [wireless service 
providers] by locking consumers into another contract term when they may not wish this to 
happen’ (Telecom Regulatory Policy, 2013, para. 273). 
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The UK Telecoms regulator, OFCOM, on the other hand, places greater emphasis on the 
individual consumer’s position and states that automatic renewal has ‘the effect of reducing 
switching by locking consumers into long contract terms with financial penalties … for exit 
[which] is likely to be harmful for [consumers] who are discouraged from switching’ (Ofcom 
2011, para 17). In addition to the damage to competition, the regulator emphasises that tie-in 
clauses might prevent consumers “from switching supplier to take advantage of new offers” 
and describes this “source of harm” as only affecting “the individual subject to the ARC 
term” (Ofcom 2011, para. 3.22). Only much later in the analysis is it recognised that 
“[s]witching costs can also harm competition” (Ofcom 2011, para. 3.40).  
While both regulators put “consumer switching” at the centre of the argument, the English 
regulator emphasises the individual detriment to the consumer, the Canadian regulator the 
detriment to competition in the wireless telephone market. The underlying purpose of the 
Canadian Wireless Code is ‘to contribute to a more dynamic wireless marketplace’ (Telecom 
Regulatory Policy, 2013, para 216) and to increase competition (OECD 2016) where 
previously a general lack of competitiveness had been lamented (Masse and Beaudry 2014; 
Hart et al. 2013); tying consumers into long-term contracts that are automatically renewed 
would be an obstacle to achieving this end. In the UK, a concern for the individual 
customer—and therefore the customer’s autonomy—goes a long way in explaining the need 
for explicit consent by the customer to any renewal. Similarly, a concern for competition in 
the market explains the Canadian approach to restricting the provider’s right to renew the 
contract automatically. The difference in the motivation behind both approaches is one of 
degree rather than substance, but it is nevertheless an important shift in emphasis (as to the 
motivation of the European legislator, see Council Directive 2009/136/EC).  
A further difference in policy is the approach to modification. It was outlined above that 
German law does not allow price rises in line with the retail price index. The reasoning seems 
to be that this might be a driving force for inflation. The need to avoid such inflation stems 
from the hyperinflation of the 1920s which caused significant disruption in Germany 
(Dodsworth 2015). Despite the general principle of nominalism in the UK (ibid, p. 279), a 
less restrictive approach prevails there, and OFCOM has specifically highlighted that there is 
no disadvantage to the consumer at all in allowing for a price rise in line with inflation 
(Ofcom 2013b, para A1.14). 
The first decision for any jurisdiction considering its attitude towards long term contracts 
would be whether this type of contract should be regulated individually or whether a more 
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overarching framework might suffice. The answer will lie in the policies of that jurisdiction 
which may need an overarching framework beyond that of consumer protection in the 
specific market segment, such as in Germany (the protection against inflation). The need for 
direct, strategic intervention could be based on a failure of the market (such as in Canada) or 
the need to protect the autonomy of the individual (as in the UK). In a competitive market, an 
overarching approach will most likely be more future-proof, with new technologies on the 
horizon. However, such an approach my stifle the introduction of new types of contract. As 
the example of Canada has shown, simply adopting an over-all consumer protectionist 
approach on all levels can have adverse effects on the price level or competition.  
 
VII. Conclusion  
This article has established that there are three factors which shape long-term mobile phone 
contracts. First, that long-term mobile phone contracts, in addition to price, are designed 
around three factors: the initial commitment period, the possibility of the contract 
automatically renewing, and the service provider’s ability to unilaterally modify the contract. 
Second, that the balance of the interests of provider and consumer is rather similar cross 
jurisdictions due to trade-offs between these features. Only where an external overbearing 
regulatory aim interferes, such as in Canada, can the balance be tipped clearly in favour of 
one party. But the protection afforded to consumers in that case is not an end in itself; it is a 
reflex of the underlying desire to open the market for more competitors by creating a higher 
level of competition.  
Third, the article has identified the policies followed by each of the jurisdictions. In Canada, 
in reaction to a market dominated by only a few large providers, policy was focused primarily 
on creating a competitive environment. In the absence of regulation, a rather business 
friendly system had established itself. This has not been the case in the USA, where there has 
been greater competition among mobile phone providers. The geographical extent and sparse 
population of Canada have made regulatory intervention necessary to boost competition. The 
English approach, in line with the general approach to contract law, favours individual, in 
particular procedural, fairness. Germany’s approach, in line with the rationale underpinning 
unfair contract terms legislation there, is centred on protection of society as a whole. The 
absence of specific regulation in the US is evidence of the pursuit of a free market policy. 
Regardless of policy position, with the exception of Canada which can be explained on the 
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basis of the far reaching regulatory intervention necessitated by external factors, the level of 
protection for consumers regarding contract design is similar. 
The above findings indicate that, as long as there is competition, regulatory intervention has a 
limited impact. If anything, its consequences tend to be negative for the customer, resulting, 
e.g., in higher prices or less competition. The example of a maximum permissible duration 
for contracts has shown that this legal interference leads to most contracts congregating at or 
near the top end. The focus, therefore, on consumer/customer protection is a less effective 
approach than focusing the creation of a competitive mobile phone market. It can thus be 
concluded that regulation provided by the general doctrines of contract law is sufficient to 
provide the required level of protection so long as there is a sufficiently competitive market. 
The adverse effects of regulation in a welfare state are discussed by Posner (1995).  
These findings can be applied to certain other types of long-term contracts more generally; 
some more traditional forms of long-term relationships follow different rules, e.g. tenancy 
agreements, due to the property law implications. In modern commerce, there is a trend 
towards long-term contractual relations rather than outright one-off transfers; this so called 
‘subscription economy’ (McKinsey 2018) has gathered pace with the advent of e-commerce, 
and in particular m-commerce, which is facilitated by mobile telephony. The clear 
implication is that regulators of this new type of subscription model as well as of some more 
established markets which commonly deal with long term contracts would be advised to 
focus their efforts on creating competitive markets for example by nudging consumers 
towards overcoming their switching inertia rather than regulating the substantive contract. A 
successful example is the current account switching guarantee in the UK, created as a result 
of the Payment Account Regulations 2015; current account switching rates have increased as 
a result of the assurances provided for bank customers (Atamer 2017, p. 651); no attempt at 
regulating the contractual relationship between banks and their customers in this respect has 
been made though. An example that is likely to be less successful is the recently introduced 
energy price cap in the UK, which creates a significant interference with the principle of 
freedom of contract and is unlikely to stimulate switching (Bisping and Dodsworth 2019). 
However, where it is not possible to create a competitive market, the regulator would be 
advised to ensure regulation of all three factors and to be aware of the possible adverse 
effects of setting absolute upper limits, but this may have the consequence of overall higher 
prices. This paper provides the following insights that might serve as guidance to legislators 
and regulators. In long-term contractual relationships, the law should aim to strike a fair 
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balance between the interests of the parties. It should provide sufficient foreseeability and 
predictability to both parties that they will be able to rely on the contract for an adequate 
amount of time; the customer should not have to fear to be left without supply, the provider 
should be able to rely that the cost of acquisition translates into an adequate profit over the 
currency of the agreement. In order to received continued supply, there should be 
mechanisms for the contract to be extended on the expiry of its original term, such extension 
requiring the consent of both parties, express or implied. The law should further allow the 
required level of flexibility when it comes to adapting the terms of the contract; external 
changes to price influencing factors should be accommodated to the extent that the 
mechanism for doing so is clear to the parties and transparent. Regulating the substance of the 
contract beyond these parameters does not bring any positive effects. 
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